Netherlands Seizes 800 Servers, Arrests 2 for Aiding Cyberattacks
Dutch authorities arrested two men and seized over 800 servers used to provide Internet infrastructure for Russian cyberattacks, influence operations, and disinformation campaigns targeting EU member states, in one of the largest takedowns of pro-Russian cyberattack hosting infrastructure in Europe.
Dutch authorities have seized over 800 servers and arrested two men for operating Internet infrastructure that enabled Russian cyberattacks, influence operations, and disinformation campaigns targeting European Union member states. The operation, carried out by the Dutch Fiscal Information and Investigation Service (FIOD), marks one of the largest takedowns of pro-Russian cyberattack infrastructure in Europe to date.
The Arrests
On May 18, 2026, FIOD agents arrested Andrey Nesterenko, a 39-year-old Russian national residing in The Hague, and Youssef Zinad, a 57-year-old from Amsterdam. The two men are accused of violating EU sanctions law by making economic resources available to entities already sanctioned by the European Union for their role in Russia's hybrid warfare efforts.
The arrests followed a year-long investigation that zeroed in on two Dutch hosting companies — MIRhosting and WorkTitans BV — that allegedly provided critical Internet connectivity to Stark Industries Solutions, a sprawling hosting provider that emerged just two weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.
Stark Industries: A Sanctioned Network
Stark Industries Solutions quickly became notorious as a staging ground for massive distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against European targets. Security researchers identified Stark as a top supplier of proxy and anonymity services repeatedly linked to cyberattacks carried out by Russia-backed hacking groups.
In May 2025, the European Union sanctioned PQHosting and its operators — Moldovan brothers Ivan and Yuri Neculiti — for providing one of Stark's two main conduits to the wider Internet. However, as KrebsOnSecurity reported in September 2025, those sanctions failed to address Stark's remaining connection: MIRhosting, an Internet service provider based in the Netherlands.
How the Network Operated
According to the Dutch daily de Volkskrant, the investigation revealed that when news of impending EU sanctions against PQHosting leaked in April 2025, Stark's network assets were quickly transferred to a new entity called "the.hosting," controlled by WorkTitans BV. WorkTitans, in turn, received its Internet connectivity exclusively through MIRhosting — where both Nesterenko and Zinad had operational ties.
MIRhosting was founded by Nesterenko in 2004 as Innovation IT Solutions Corp., a company with a notable history: it hosted stopgeorgia.ru, a hacktivist website used to coordinate cyberattacks against Georgia during Russia's 2008 invasion of the country — believed to be the first war in which a major cyberattack coincided with conventional military operations.
De Volkskrant reviewed data showing that WorkTitans and MIRhosting were the most heavily utilized networks in pro-Russian attacks on Danish government bodies between November 13 and 19, 2025 — the week of Denmark's municipal elections.
Evidence and Assets Seized
During the coordinated raids, FIOD investigators searched three businesses in Enschede and Almere, as well as two data centers in Dronten and Schiphol-Rijk. They seized laptops, mobile phones, and more than 800 servers from the.hosting infrastructure. Customers of the service received a message stating that data stored on the seized servers had been lost and could not be recovered.
The scale of the seizure — 800 servers — suggests the operation was supporting a significant volume of cyberattack activity, underscoring the extent to which Russian-linked cyber operations have relied on European hosting infrastructure to avoid sanctions and detection.
Denials and Internal Investigations
Prior to his arrest, Nesterenko denied knowledge that his servers were being misused by pro-Russian cybercriminals. He told de Volkskrant that he had ended all services with the Neculiti brothers once EU sanctions came into force in May 2025, and reserved the right to take legal action against what he called "harmful and incorrect publications."
MIRhosting released a statement saying it had initiated an internal investigation and had temporarily paused services to WorkTitans as a precautionary measure. The company claimed there were "no indications" that services under its control were used to influence the Danish elections, noting that no traffic anomalies or spikes had been observed and that no abuse reports had been received prior to media inquiries.
Responding to questions via email, Nesterenko maintained that MIRhosting does not support cybercrime, sanctions evasion, or illegal activity. "The transition to the.hosting was not intended to evade sanctions," he wrote. "Closing or damaging a legitimate Dutch infrastructure company will not stop cybercrime, but it will harm many people who have done nothing wrong."
Broader Implications
The takedown highlights a persistent challenge for Western law enforcement: Russian cyber operations continue to rely on hosting infrastructure located within EU member states, leveraging legal gaps and slow-moving sanctions enforcement to maintain operational capacity. Even after high-profile sanctions, networks are quickly restructured, assets are transferred to new entities, and connectivity is re-established through alternative providers.
The case also underscores the importance of financial crime investigation units like the FIOD in disrupting cyberattack infrastructure. Unlike traditional cybercrime investigations that focus on taking down botnets or arresting individual hackers, this operation targeted the enablers — the hosting providers and network operators who supply the foundational infrastructure for large-scale cyberattacks.
For now, Nesterenko and Zinad face charges of violating sanctions law. The case is expected to test the reach of EU sanctions enforcement in the digital domain and may set precedents for how European nations hold hosting providers accountable for the activities of their clients.
As the investigation continues, cybersecurity experts warn that similar infrastructure reconfiguration patterns are likely being used by other hosting providers across Europe. The Dutch operation, while substantial, addresses only one node in a much larger ecosystem of Russian-linked cyberattack infrastructure — and the arrests in Amsterdam may already be prompting similar networks to relocate and restructure once again.



